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Oct. 7 wasn't bad luck or a one-off intelligence miss — it was the predictable payoff of 15 years of propping up Hamas. Suitcases of Qatari cash, shelved plans to take out Sinwar, warnings from Shin Bet chiefs and even a foreign head of state brushed aside. Now the leader who calls himself an expert on terror continues blocking a state commission of inquiry, and that alone says everything about who is dodging accountability.
The intelligence and security chiefs said flat out that Hamas was deterred and recommended staying the course, and even 75 minutes before the attack, the assessment called a broad campaign unlikely. Orders came down to kill Hamas operatives and hit hard, and the same generals now pointing fingers opposed taking Gaza. The rot started with the 2000 Lebanon withdrawal and 2005 Gaza disengagement, not with the leadership that warned against them.
Oct. 7 did not occur in a vacuum. It emerged from decades of occupation, settlement expansion, and the Gaza blockade, which subjected roughly 2 million Palestinians to severe restrictions on movement, economic life and political self-determination, while offering no credible path toward sovereignty. Repeatedly managing the conflict through military operations and economic pressure, rather than addressing its underlying political causes, created the conditions in which Hamas could carry out its devastating attack.